Date of Event:  10/2/2015

Canyon involved:  Not Imlay

Region:  Zion National Park, Utah 

Country:  USA

Submitted by:  Dave Nally

Source:  “Deaths & Rescues in Zion National Park” by Dave Nally

Injury:  Fatality

Cause:  Rappel error, Navigation error, Fall or slip, Rappel off end of rope, Inadequate equipment

 

Description of Event:  On Friday, October 2, 2015, Christian Louis Johnson, age 50, from Saint George, Utah, fell several hundred feet to his death on the first rappel, while canyoneering with three others in Not Imlay Canyon. This canyon is a side canyon of Imlay Canyon, and it has become increasingly popular in recent years as a shorter, drier route compared to Imlay Canyon; however, it is not any less technical or dangerous.


The park was alerted at 1:00 p.m. by one of the group members, and a rescue operation was started immediately. A helicopter was used to drop off a Search and Rescue team at the top of the canyon.


Johnson was canyoneering with three others, including his husband, Everett Boutillet. The two had been canyoneering together since 2010 and had “descended more than 100 canyons 200 times in five states” according to Boutillet. This was the couple’s second descent of Not Imlay Canyon. “Zion was our favorite park. Our favorite place to be. Our first canyon was the ‘Subway’ and we were instantly addicted,” said Boutillet. “Louis and I understood the risks, but the joy that it brought outweighed them.” Johnson’s mother, Joy Johnson, added “Nature gave him so much peace.”


In the weeks following this tragedy, Everett Boutillet wrote about this story online. Here are some of his comments:

“Thanks for your patience while I recover from the loss of my husband and life partner of 21 years. The moments and particularly the sounds of Louis’ fall have been seared into my mind forever. The way I see it, there were two glaringly obvious mistakes: First, why was a 100-foot rope set on a 280-foot rappel? And second, after realizing mistake number one, how did Louis react and why?


I think there is a general eagerness to get into a canyon. This may have contributed to a rushed decision. I need to state right off that Louis and I alone are responsible for what occurred that day.


I’ll get right to the fatal first rappel. As we made the final walk down the beautiful slickrock ramp, the “new anchor” stood out like a beacon. We had used it last year. Before setting the rope, I pointed out the location of the “old anchor”. There was no webbing or anchor on the tree. This is when lightning bolts of caution should have hit us. They did not. At this point, Louis and I had no memory of doing the first and second raps as one single combined rappel.


I can honestly say we both thought Louis was going down 100 feet to a ledge. Louis dumped the 200-foot rope out of its rope bag, found the ends and began to thread the rope, doubled, through the rap ring. I immediately asked him why he was doubling it. I expressed my concern about getting the doubled rope through my new rappel device, the Sqwurel. More serious concerns escaped my attention. Louis said something to the effect that “we’ve done it before, it’ll work”. I quickly acquiesced. (Now I wonder – what, a 100-foot rope on a 100-foot rappel? No room for error. The rope was in a bag, why not just send it down, listen for it to land per usual? Why not set a block with a contingency?)

 

Louis said he’d set up the next rappel and took the only other rope with him. (Should we have had another rope? Probably) Did he need to take the second rope? No, there was no need for our group of four to be in a hurry. Did the added weight contribute to his fall? Possibly.)
This first rap has a long sloping beginning. Louis went over and was gone far too long before we heard him shout up (due to the elapsed time he must have been close to the end of the rope). We had trouble hearing him. The Virgin (River) is visible and audible from there. There was also an updraft that may have made communication more difficult. I conferred with my two partners, Jeremy and Shannon, and we agreed Louis had said that the rope was too short.


I believe he repeated it and added that the end of the rope was eight feet short. This was almost certainly inaccurate. I was shown photos five days after the accident (taken from the bottom looking up). I was horrified. Louis said, “I need you to send down the other rope.” Up top, we all realized immediately that we didn’t have one. Louis realized this as well as I remember panicked silence after that.


I went down and left to the “old anchor” site, a tree at the edge. I could now see the top third or so of the line and could now hear Louis clearly. I could not see him or what exactly he was facing. Both our minds were racing. I shouted down an idea, Louis quickly rejected it. I started to say something else and Louis said “Everett, shut up” in a panicked voice. Very little was said, there wasn’t time.

 

Based on the sounds I heard next, I can only use conjecture as to what happened. Louis either slipped off the end of the rope, or he intentionally let go–thinking he could make a landing. I believe it was the latter–perhaps that’s what I need to believe. He did not scream or yell at that point. Then a series of the worst kind of sounds you hope you’ll never hear: He landed quickly but didn’t stop. Shannon first described what she heard next as “a commotion”. To me it sounded like a rolling or tumbling. Then a terrible short scream, a sickening short pause, and a final awful crash.


I have brave friends who did Not Imlay about a week later. Based on information from one of them, Louis was likely 20 feet from a landing, But it slopes downward and there are two ledges after that, neither of which could have stopped him. So the tumbling I thought I heard was likely a fall from ledge to ledge. What could have happened before that fatal moment? Louis should have looked for the bottom of the rope sooner, he should have tied off immediately, we should have established clear communication sooner, he could have hung on that rappel for 20 minutes, two hours, whatever it took. We could have figured something out if given the time to calm down and think carefully. I’m not going to list possible solutions because I frankly don’t know if my ideas would have worked.


Louis didn’t have ascenders–the rest of us did. We had always assumed we could share one pair. We have had to ascend due to stuck ropes four times (everyone needs to practice this skill more). I carried the ascenders, I was the climber. If given time we could have found a way to get ascenders to Louis. It’s important that everyone understand that he was on the rope for just a few minutes before he dropped or fell.”

 

 

Analysis:  

  1. It is essential to verify the rope reaches to the bottom of the rappel. If it is not possible to do so, there are ways to mitigate this. 
    1. It can be rigged as a contingency anchor where in the first person can be lowered to the ground. Rigging as a double stranded “toss and go” makes this more difficult. 
    2. Consider tying a large knot in the end of the rope as a safety device. This should not be done in moving water.
  2. All canyoneers should have the skill and minimum gear necessary to ascend the rope. This gear needs to be on the harness, not in the pack. 
  3. Generally it is best if the last person down has extra rope to use if something goes wrong. 
  4. Canyons change. Anchors change. Memories fade. Despite having descended a canyon in the past, if something does not seem correct, it is time to discuss the situation with the team and develop a consensus. 

 

ICAD Analysis:

 

Although “toss and go” rope/team techniques have the advantage of being faster, they add elements of risk that may not be readily apparent. 

 

  1. Ropes and rope bags tend to change users frequently. Since ropes can have different rappelling characteristics, even with the “same” diameter, this can add uncertainty and add to rappelling risks, as some users may find certain ropes too fast or too slow on their particular device and at their level of weight, which may require more friction adjustments, particularly on long rappels or more technical rappels.
  2. It can be difficult to track who has what equipment if everyone is not equally equipped with ropes, ascending devices, and emergency gear. If there is a problem, a particular team may not have the equipment to deal with it, and other team members who do may be too far out of reach to communicate with or to come back. 
  3. Because teams tend to move faster, they also can become more spread out, making it more difficult for team members to assist each other or communicate in the event of a problem, particularly if there is a wide range of experience amongst the group.
  4. Communication is more difficult, so challenging obstacles get less input and analysis from team members who may be farther behind, or too far upfront when a team towards the back experiences an unexpected problem that did not occur when the first teams were sent down (eg. signs of anchor stress, rope damage, a person having a problem, etc).

 

Double stranded rappels, while faster to set up, are not as suited to contingencies when compared to releasable, single-line, rappels. Furthermore, if there is a need to ascend due to a problem, many devices or techniques do not work, or do not work well, on double ropes. Also, if a single rope is used for a rappel (even if a releasable anchor is not set up), the other end of the rope is available for use and could be used to lower equipment or another person to assist with a problem, or to set up a releasable anchor after the fact if additional rope length is needed. Using all of the rope by double stranding (or loading both sides of the rope with the same load) removes these options. 

 

When building systems, due care is necessary to apply the right techniques at that moment in time for that situation; past performance is no guarantee of future performance or success, as conditions can change (eg. people’s mental or physical state, the canyon, the weather, etc) for a variety of reasons, making a “simple and easy rappel” suddenly considerably more difficult or complicated. Thus, while contingency systems may take more time and equipment, they should be used when feasible, as problems tend to occur when they are least convenient, and they often compound and grow. Problems can even occur mid rappel, or after several team members have rappeled without issue. When the decision is made to not use a system with a contingency, a contingency should be in place (eg. secondary anchor locations evaluated, equipment necessary to rescue the other person on the other system available, sufficient experience and capability of other team members, etc), as there is often little time to contemplate these things during an emergency.     

 

In general, more experienced team members should go first, and by extension, have the means to deal with whatever problems they may encounter on their own, should the team members above not be able to assist quickly. However, having experienced team members spread throughout the group, at the top and bottom of rappels, makes self-rescues or troubleshooting issues far easier; thus, at a minimum, groups of 4 are recommended with two or more experienced canyoneers for the conditions and types of canyons being descended.

 

Although easier said than done, one piece of advice that has served well is, “in the event of an emergency, do not panic.” Everyone makes mistakes (particularly in hindsight), but when mistakes are made, it is important not to compound on those mistakes by making panicked or rushed decisions that can make the situation worse. The more that contingency and “what if” scenarios are discussed in advance, the less likely difficult situations will devolve into intractable problems. Thus, safety, equipment, and emergency/contingency discussions should be had even before canyons are entered, and when teams do descend, having the right mindset and equipment, and redundancy of that equipment, is critical.